Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this article, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in these terms.
, [2011] ; Shallice [2003] ; Poldrack and Wagner [2004] ; Henson [2005] , [2006] , [2011] ; Poldrack [2006] , [2010] ). In this article, I will discuss the most influential of these inferential strategies 1 : reverse inference. 2 Despite its popularity, the inductive validity of reverse inference has recently been questioned (Henson [2005] ; Poldrack [2006] ), and an increasing number of cognitive neuroscientists now view this inferential pattern with skepticism. In this article, I defend reverse inference: I argue that when reverse inference is recast in likelihoodist terms, patterns of brain activation provide genuine evidence for and against psychological hypotheses. Here is how I will proceed: In Section 2, I describe reverse inference and I illustrate its use in cognitive neuroscience. In Section 3, I show that when it is cast in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference is immune to the main objections against it. In Section 4, I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in likelihoodist terms. 
Reverse Inference
When cognitive neuroscientists reverse infer, they conclude that a particular psychological process or event (be it a cognitive process, an emotion, a mood, etc.) is recruited by an experimental task from the fact that a particular pattern of brain activation is elicited during this task. As it is typically used in cognitive neuroscience, reverse inference rests on two premises and has the following structure:
Argument structure of typical reverse inferences:
(A) When psychological process, p, is recruited by a task, pattern of brain activation, E, is likely to be found.
(B) In task T, pattern of brain activation, E, was found.
(C) Hence, psychological process p was recruited by task T.
The conclusion, (C), does not, and is not meant to, follow deductively from premises (A) and (B). Rather, reverse inferences are, and are meant to be, inductive: Premises (A) and (B) are meant to provide a non-conclusive reason to hold (C). Premise (A) is typically supported by surveying, often informally, the existing literature in neuroimagery. Such literature reviews examine whether tasks that are believed to recruit psychological process p are likely 1 For instance, Anderson ([2010a] ) notes the frequency of reverse inferences in Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. 2 For a discussion of another influential strategy- Henson's ([2005] , [2006] ) function-to-structure inference or forward inference-see (Machery [2012] ). 3 In this article, 'likely' does not have the technical sense that it has in the likelihoodist literature.
Rather, 'likely' will be used in its everyday sense as a synonym of 'probable'.
to elicit pattern E. Premise (B) describes the experimental data to which reverse inference is applied. Consider, for instance, Greene et al.'s ([2001] ) article on moral judgements. While undergoing brain scanning, participants were presented with sixty dilemmas that were classified as non-moral, moral-impersonal, or moralpersonal. The footbridge trolley dilemma (in which participants judge whether it is permissible to push someone from a footbridge in order to stop a runaway trolley that is about to kill five people) illustrates the class of moral-personal dilemmas, while the bystander trolley dilemma (in which participants judge whether it is permissible for a bystander to push a lever that will divert a runaway trolley that is about to kill five people onto a sidetrack where the trolley will kill a single person) illustrates the class of moral-impersonal dilemmas. Greene and colleagues singled out the brain areas that responded more to moral-personal dilemmas than to moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas-BA 9 and 10 in the medial frontal gyrus, BA 31 in the posterior cingulate gyrus, and BA 39 in the angular gyrus (bilateral)-as well as those areas that responded less to the former class of dilemmas than to the latter class of dilemmas-BA 46 in the middle frontal gyrus (right) and BA 7/40 in the parietal lobe (bilateral). The second premise of Greene et al.'s reverse inference describes this pattern of brain activation. Furthermore, Greene and colleagues review the empirical literature showing that BA 9 and 10, BA 31, and BA 39 are activated in tasks recruiting emotional processing: citing four cognitive-neuroscientific studies, they write that '[r]ecent functional imaging studies have associated each of these areas with emotion' ([2001] , p. 2107). Citing two studies, they also assert that BA 46 and BA 7/40 are 'both associated with working memory'. This informal, succinct literature review provides evidence for the first premise of their reverse inference. On the basis of the pattern of brain activation found in their experiments and of their succinct literature review, Greene et al. ([2001] , p. 2106) conclude that [. . .] from a psychological point of view, the crucial difference between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter's tendency to engage people's emotions in a way that the former does not. The thought of pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences, and it is this emotional response that accounts for people's tendency to treat these cases differently.
(B) Reading moral-personal dilemmas resulted in greater activation of BA 9 and 10, BA 31, and BA 39 than reading moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas.
(C) Hence, moral-personal dilemmas (e.g. the footbridge trolley dilemma) elicit greater emotional processing than moral-impersonal (e.g. the bystander trolley dilemma) or non-moral dilemmas.
Consider, more briefly, an additional example. Richeson et al.'s ([2003] ) experiment was meant to test the hypothesis that interracial interactions weaken people's executive resources (as shown by, for example, ) because executive function is a finite resource that can be temporarily depleted. White participants were given an implicit association test (IAT), interacted with a black participant, then completed a Stroop task 4 ; in a distinct experiment, they were presented with black faces while undergoing brain scanning. For present purposes, let's focus on this latter experiment, which involves a reverse inference. Richeson and colleagues found that, while viewing black faces, activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) correlated with people's implicit bias toward Blacks, as measured by the IAT. This provides the content of the second premise of their reverse inference. Based on the cognitive-neuroscientific literature, they assume that reliance on executive function activates the right DLPFC: as they put it ([2003] , p. 1323), citing about twenty studies, 'we based the present investigation on emerging literature in cognitive neuroscience that has identified a complex circuit of brain structures-consisting, in part of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulated cortex (ACC)-that supports executive control'. This literature provides empirical support for the first premise of their reverse inference. The conclusion of their reverse inference is that, the greater one's implicit bias is, the more one attempts to control it, and thus the more one's executive function is taxed (which contributes to the explanation of why more biased individuals tend to do worse on the Stroop task after having met a black experimenter). This reverse inference can also be recast along the lines of the argument structure presented earlier: (A) When executive function is recruited, the DLPFC is likely to be activated.
(B) When presented with black faces, the greater a participant's implicit bias, the more the DLPFC was activated.
(C) Hence, when presented with black faces, the greater a participant's implicit bias, the more people's executive function was recruited.
In these two cases, as well as in many other cases, cognitive neuroscientists conclude that a task recruits a particular psychological process or elicits a particular mental state on the grounds that the brain areas activated in the task are known to be activated when this process is recruited or when this mental state is elicited. But are they justified in so doing? Under which conditions are cognitive neuroscientists justified in treating patterns of brain activation as evidence for the conclusions of reverse inferences? In the remainder of this article, I will attempt to delineate these conditions. 5 3 Reverse Inference Defended 3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious When they reverse infer, cognitive neuroscientists typically treat patterns of brain activation as evidence that particular psychological processes are recruited by particular tasks on the grounds that these patterns of brain activation are likely to be found when these processes are recruited. The problem is that, for a pattern of activation, E, to be evidence for the conclusion that a psychological process, p, is recruited by a task, T, it is not sufficient that E be likely to occur when p is recruited, because E could be even more likely to occur when psychological processes other than p are recruited. So, a particular pattern of brain activation constitutes evidence for the conclusion of a reverse inference if and only if it is more likely to occur when the psychological process under consideration is recruited by an experimental task than when it is not recruited.
This observation is the gist of Poldrack's ([2006] ) influential critique of reverse inference as it is typically applied in cognitive neuroscience (see also Henson [2005] ; Harrison [2008] ): it is fallacious to infer from a particular pattern of brain activation and from the fact that tasks recruiting a particular psychological process, p, are likely to elicit this pattern that the task under consideration recruits p because one then does not take into account the probability of obtaining this pattern of brain activation when p is not recruited.
Poldrack puts this point in simple Bayesian terms. According to Bayesians (for example, Earman [1992] ; Howson and Urbach [1993] ), a piece of evidence, E, supports a hypothesis, H, if and only if the posterior probability of H conditional of E is larger than its prior probability. In turn, as H and H are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, 6 this inequality holds if and only E is more likely if H is true than if H is false. Thus, a particular pattern of brain 5 In the terminology of Bandyopadhyay and Brittan ([2006] ), I will focus on 'the evidence question'-under which conditions do patterns of brain activation provide evidence for the conclusions of reverse inferences?-rather than 'the belief question'-under which conditions are cognitive neuroscientists justified in believing the conclusion of a reverse inference? 6 I am grateful to a reviewer for highlighting this assumption. activation supports the hypothesis that psychological process p is recruited by T if and only if the probability of the occurrence of this pattern of brain activation if p is recruited, is higher than the probability of its occurrence if p is not recruited.
No quick and easy fix
One may think that a small fix is all that is needed to remedy the invalidity of reverse inferences (e.g. Harrison [2008] , pp. 536-7). Cognitive neuroscientists should compare the probability of the occurrence of the pattern of brain activation observed during T if p is recruited and the probability of its occurrence if p is not recruited, instead of just taking into account the former probability. A pattern of activation provides evidence for the conclusion that p is recruited by T if and only if the former probability is larger than the latter.
While cognitive neuroscientists would be justified in treating patterns of brain activation as evidence for the conclusions of reverse inferences if this necessary and sufficient condition were met, this Bayesian characterization of reverse inference is not very useful for two distinct reasons. First, in many cases, cognitive neuroscientists have no sense of the probability of obtaining a particular pattern of brain activation if psychological process p is not recruited by experimental tasks and, as a result, they do not know whether the observed pattern of activation gives them a reason to conclude that the psychological process of interest was involved during the task under consideration. Second, as meta-analyses and systematic literature reviews of the activation of particular brain areas across experimental tasks show (for example, for the precuneus, see Cavanna and Trimble [2006] ; for the posterior cingulate cortex, see Vann et al. [2009] ; see also Anderson [2010b] ; Yarkoni et al. [2010] ), many brain areas are such that they are activated when many different psychological processes are recruited. As a result, the probability of obtaining a particular pattern of brain activation when the psychological process of interest is not recruited is likely to be high. In this case, observing the relevant pattern of brain activation can only provide at best weak evidence, if any evidence at all, for the psychological hypothesis under consideration.
At this point, it may be tempting to simply reject every inference that a particular psychological process is recruited by an experimental task on the basis of the activation of the brain during this task. Influenced by Poldrack, many cognitive neuroscientists and cognitive scientists now regard reverse inference with skepticism, 7 and some recommend that it be completely Reverse inference can thus be recast in likelihoodist terms: cognitive neuroscientists are justified in treating a pattern of brain activation, E, as providing evidence for the hypothesis that a task, T, recruits a first psychological process, p 1 , over the hypothesis that it recruits another psychological process, p 2 , if and only if E is more likely to be found when p 1 is recruited than when p 2 is recruited.
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So recast, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted earlier in this section. First, there is now nothing fallacious in overlooking the probability that a pattern of brain activation occurs when a particular psychological process is not recruited. Second, it is not of limited utility: neither cognitive neuroscientists' ignorance of this probability nor its possible high value stand in the way of using patterns of brain activation as evidence for 8 Or more than three if more than two hypotheses are competing. 9 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, this is reminiscent of Lipton's inference to the best explanation (Lipton [1991] ). particular psychological hypotheses. Cognitive neuroscientists only need to take into account the probability that the pattern of brain activation under consideration occurs when the specific psychological processes, which are mentioned in the competing hypotheses, are recruited by experimental tasks.
An example
If one views reverse inference in Bayesian terms, one is forced to conclude that Greene and colleagues invalidly inferred that moral-personal dilemmas elicit more emotional processing than moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas. They did not take into account the probability that the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the angular gyrus are activated when psychological processes other than emotional processing are recruited by experimental tasks. Furthermore, it is unclear whether taking into account this probability so as to counter the invalidity charge would have helped Greene and colleagues. Because, as Klein ([2011] ) argues, the neuroscientific literature suggests that the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the angular gyrus are activated when processes other than emotional processing are involved in a task. Greene et al.'s findings could have provided at best weak evidence for their hypothesis. In contrast, when Greene and colleagues' reverse inference is recast in likelihoodist terms, it becomes irrelevant that the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the angular gyrus are activated when a variety of psychological processes other than emotional processing are recruited by experimental tasks. Let's see in detail how this works.
In a likelihoodist framework, one always compares several particular hypotheses, and one examines the probability of the evidence in light of these hypotheses. The relevant hypotheses for Greene and colleagues are the following ones:
H 1 : People respond differently to moral-personal and moralimpersonal dilemmas because the former elicit more emotional processing than the latter.
H 2 : People respond differently to moral-personal and moralimpersonal dilemmas because the single moral rule that is applied to both kinds of dilemmas (for example, the doctrine of double effect) yields different permissibility judgments.
Greene and colleagues favour H 1 , whereas other authors (for example, Nichols and Mallon [2006] ) favour H 2 . Greene and colleagues correctly treated the observed pattern of activation as evidence for the hypothesis they favour if the probability that the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the angular gyrus are activated during emotional processing is Edouard Machery larger than the probability that they are activated when a moral rule or a moral principle such as the doctrine of double effect is applied to a case. As this inequality holds, evidence does support the hypothesis that moral-personal dilemmas elicit more emotional processing than moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas over the hypothesis that a single moral rule was applied to both kinds of dilemmas (for another example, see Section 4.2).
Appropriateness of the Likelihoodist Approach
In this final section, I examine five objections that could be raised against the likelihoodist treatment of reverse inference presented in this article. These objections assert successively that likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable; that, even if it is applicable, it is not useful for cognitive neuroscientists; that, in any case, it often does not differ from Bayesian reverse inference; that, even if it is applicable, useful, and differs from Bayesian reverse inference; it is confusing; and finally that, even if it is applicable, useful, differs from Bayesian reverse inference, and is not distinctively confusing, it is not needed.
Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable
According to the likelihoodist framework developed here, reverse inference can only be useful if cognitive neuroscientists have some sense of how likely it is that some pattern of activation will be observed if two distinct psychological processes, p 1 and p 2 , are recruited by experimental tasks. However, one could object that this knowledge is often lacking.
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This objection rightly notes that likelihoodist reverse inference can only be used when two competing psychological hypotheses, H 1 and H 2 , are available and when, based on the existing literature, cognitive neuroscientists expect two different patterns of brain activation if p 1 is recruited and if p 2 is recruited. In some research contexts, this knowledge will be missing, and likelihoodist reverse inference won't be applicable there. On the other hand, in some contexts, this knowledge is available, and conceiving reverse inference in likelihoodist terms allows cognitive neuroscientists to apply reverse inference there.
One may wonder how in practice one determines the probabilities that a particular pattern of brain activation occurs if p 1 is recruited and if p 2 is recruited, and whether determining these probabilities relies on past reverse inferences.
11 While past reverse inferences may play a role, they do not seem necessary. To determine whether it is likely that one would observe a 10 I owe this objection to Matt Bateman. 11 I owe this question to Rik Henson. particular pattern of brain activation if, say, the hypothesis that psychological process p 1 is involved, one can look at other tasks (tasks different from T) that are known to recruit p 1 based on behavioural data, neuropsychological data such as dissociations, self-reports, and so on. To illustrate, consider Greene et al. ([2001] ). Many tasks are known to recruit emotions on the basis of behavioural data, physiological data, and self-reports. One can examine which brain areas tend to be activated in these tasks in order to get a sense of how likely it is that a particular pattern of activation is found if emotional processing is elicited. Importantly, this procedure assumes that the neural correlate of a particular psychological process or of a particular psychological state (for example, fear) does not vary from one task to the other.
Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions
If reverse inference is understood in likelihoodist terms, it is intrinsically comparative: reverse inference can only show that evidence supports a particular psychological hypothesis more than a competing one. One may thus object that cognitive neuroscientists are not merely (if at all) interested in comparative claims; rather, they want to provide evidence for their hypothesis, understood in non-comparative terms. For instance, Greene and colleagues' goal was to provide evidence for the hypothesis that moral-personal dilemmas elicit more emotional processing than moral-impersonal dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas, not merely to provide evidence supporting this hypothesis over a competing hypothesis (for example, that a single moral rule was applied to both kinds of dilemmas). Understood in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference is thus unable to fulfill cognitive neuroscientists' goals.
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There are two mutually-consistent responses to this objection: first, appearances notwithstanding, cognitive neuroscientists who use reverse inference are in fact sometimes, and perhaps often, interested in comparative claims; second, when they are not, they are typically mistaken to use reverse inference. I briefly elaborate on these two responses.
First, when cognitive neuroscientists use brain images to support a psychological hypothesis, they are sometimes weighing on a controversy between two competing psychological hypotheses that disagree about the nature of the processes involved in some task. Typically, one of these two hypotheses entails that a first psychological process is recruited by this task, while the other hypothesis entails that a distinct process is recruited. In these cases, cognitive neuroscientists' goal is, at least implicitly, comparative, and reverse inference conceived in likelihoodist terms is well suited to this goal. Indeed, it is easy to recast some uses of reverse inference in cognitive neuroscience in comparative terms, even when reverse inference was not originally presented to support a comparative conclusion. The discussion of Greene et al. ([2001] ) in Section 3.4 illustrates this claim.
More important, some existing cognitive-neuroscientific studies are explicitly comparing two psychological hypotheses, and such comparisons amount to applying implicitly the likelihoodist reverse inference described in this article. Fernandes et al.'s ([2005] ) goal was to test two alternative hypotheses that had been put forth to explain the effect of divided attention during episodic recollection.
13 According to the first hypothesis, H 1 , episodic retrieval is disrupted by a concurrent task because retrieval and this task compete for general attentional resources. According to the second hypothesis, H 2 , this disruption is due to the fact that retrieval and the concurrent task 'compete for specific structural representations' (p. 1115), viz. to the fact that the concurrent task involves retrieving some information (for example, phonological and word representations) that is related to what one tries to remember. While undergoing brain scanning, participants were asked to perform a word-recognition task either without a competing task (full-attention condition) or with either a word-related or a digit-related concurrent task (divided-attention condition). Based on the existing literature about the neural correlates of verbal processing, the use of domain-general attentional resources, and memory retrieval, Fernandes and colleagues held that, if H 1 were true-if memory retrieval taps into general attentional resources-then a particular pattern of brain activation would be observed: more activation in the DLPFC for the word-related task than for the digit-related task and no difference between the word-related and digit-related task in the neural correlates of verbal processing and memory retrieval (left inferior frontal, left temporal, and left supramarginal cortex), as well as no difference between these two tasks in the areas related to memory retrieval (hippocampus, parietal lobe, precuneus). They also held that, if H 2 is true, this pattern of brain activation should not be observed. Rather, a different pattern should be found, involving a difference between the word-related and digit-related tasks in the neural correlates of verbal processing and memory retrieval. The latter pattern having been observed, they drew the following comparative conclusion ([2005] , p. 1115): 'Results also support a component-process model of retrieval which posits that MTL-mediated (medial temporal lobe) retrieval does not compete for general cognitive resources but does compete for specific structural representations'. This is a clear (albeit implicit) likelihoodist use of reverse inference. However, it is also true that some other uses of reverse inference cannot be so recast because reverse inference is then not used (even implicitly) to weigh on a controversy between two psychological hypotheses. In these cases, reverse inference will typically not be applicable. The reason is that reverse inference cannot be put in likelihoodist terms, and has to be recast in Bayesian terms. Then, on pain of committing a fallacy, cognitive neuroscientists have to take into account the probability of observing the pattern of activation obtained in the task under consideration if the psychological hypothesis is false. But, this probability is often unknown, and, when it is known, it often turns out to be high (because many psychological processes produce this pattern of activation).
It is unclear how often reverse inference can be recast in likelihoodist terms, but one can be confident that this is often possible when brain imagery data are used for psychological purposes-to better understand which cognitive processes or psychological states are involved in a particular task-because cognitive neuroscientists then start with existing psychological hypotheses about these processes or states. They bring a new form of data to bear on a few competing hypotheses.
A philosophically-minded reader could perhaps push the objection under consideration one step further and ask whether the interpretation of reverse inference in likelihoodist, comparative terms is committed to the controversial claim that evidential support is necessarily comparative.
14 However, this interpretation is compatible with the view that there are two distinct notions of evidential support: a comparative and a non-comparative notion. But then, our reader could object, if I do not reject the notion of non-comparative evidential support, why do I think that cognitive neuroscientists should be aiming for contrastive evidential support rather than non-comparative evidential support? The reason is that, in many inferential contexts in cognitive neuroscience (Section 3), it is dubious that non-comparative evidential support can be obtained, while contrastive evidential support is available. In these contexts, cognitive neuroscientists should aim for the latter.
Reverse inference and negative hypotheses
The third objection follows up on the second objection. Some psychological controversies do not pit a first hypothesis, H 1 -that a particular psychological process, p 1 , is recruited by a task-against a competing hypothesis, H 2 -that another particular psychological process, p 2 , is recruited by this task. Rather, they pit H 1 against its negation, namely, the hypothesis that it is not the case that p 1 is recruited by this task. For this kind of controversy, showing that P(EjH 1 ) > P(EjH 2 ) amounts to showing that P(EjH 1 ) > P(EjH 1 ), and likelihoodist and Bayesian reverse inferences are identical.
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My response can be brief as it is similar to the response provided above. When a psychological controversy has this form, reverse inference will often not be applicable.
Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists
The fourth objection is also connected to the comparative nature of likelihoodist reverse inference. One could concede that reverse inference can be put in likelihoodist terms, but object that putting it in these terms would be dangerous because cognitive neuroscientists are likely to forget its comparative nature. They are thus likely to interpret the conclusions of likelihoodist reverse inferences in non-comparative terms. 16 For instance, cognitive neuroscientists may be prone to conclude from Greene et al. ([2001] ) that evidence suggests that moral-personal dilemmas elicit more emotional processing than moral-impersonal dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas. This conclusion is not comparative and it is not supported by the likelihoodist reverse inference. This objection should be resisted. That a particular form of inference can be misused or misunderstood is no argument against it; it merely shows that cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists should be cautious. Indeed, every form of inference carries some risks of misunderstanding and misapplication, and, if carrying such a risk were a ground for rejecting a form of inference, scientists would be left with no way to draw conclusions from data. For instance, statisticians and methodologists have often noted that null hypothesis significance testing prompts psychologists to mistake significance values for the posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true (for example, Morrison and Henkel [1970] ; Oakes [1986] ; for discussion, see Machery [unpublished] ). Closer to home, reverse inference conceived in Bayesian terms can also lead to misuses or misunderstandings because cognitive neuroscientists may overlook that the validity of a Bayesian reverse inference depends on the probability of obtaining the pattern of activation under consideration if the psychological hypothesis is false, or they may confuse the claim that evidence supports a particular hypothesis for the claim that the posterior probability of this hypothesis is high.
15 Mazviita Chirimuuta and Michael Anderson raised an objection along these lines. 16 I owe this objection to Russ Poldrack.
Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences
Finally, one could object that I have given short shrift to the quick fix of reverse inference presented in Section 3.2. When cognitive neuroscientists are able to estimate the probability of obtaining the pattern of activation under consideration if the psychological hypothesis is false, and if this probability is smaller than the probability of observing the pattern of activation under consideration if the psychological hypothesis is true, they are justified in treating the relevant pattern of brain activation as providing non-comparative evidence for the conclusion of the relevant reverse inference.
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The problem, however, is that for many areas we do not have such estimates. Fortunately, when reverse inference is recast in likelihoodist terms, cognitive neuroscientists can do without these estimates. In other cases, because the probability of obtaining the pattern of activation under consideration if the psychological hypothesis is false is high, the probability of a pattern of activation if process p is recruited and if it is not recruited are similar, and the pattern of activation under consideration does not provide evidence for the psychological hypothesis of interest. For instance, Yarkoni et al. ([2011] ) showed that the anterior cingulate and anterior insula are active in many different tasks. Fortunately, the similarity of the probability of a pattern of activation if process p is recruited and if it is not recruited is not relevant when reverse inference is recast in likelihoodist terms.
Finally, it is important to see that our capacity to predict with a surprising accuracy which of a number of tasks, a participant is engaged in on the basis of brain imagery data (for example, Poldrack et al. [2009] ; Yarkoni et al. [2011] ) does not justify relying on Bayesian reverse inference. These studies are only able to provide an estimate of P(EjH) and to compute P(HjE) because they restrict the space of possible hypotheses to a group of known, mutually-exclusive hypotheses. In effect, they are comparing P(EjH 1 ) to P(EjH 2 ) to P(EjH 3 ), and so on. If anything, this is in the spirit of likelihoodist reverse inference.
Conclusion
Reverse inference is a common inferential strategy in cognitive neuroscience. It allows cognitive neuroscientists to mend the bridge between the brain and the mind by turning brain images into data that bear on psychological hypotheses. From a Bayesian point of view, typical reverse inferences are invalid because they do not take into account the probability that the pattern of brain activation would have been obtained if the psychological hypothesis 17 I owe this objection to Russ Poldrack. were false. Reformulated in Bayesian terms, reverse inference seems often of little use as too often either we do not know the relevant probabilities or the pattern of brain activation would probably have been obtained if the psychological hypothesis were false. By and large, cognitive neuroscientists have concluded from this analysis that reverse inference is at best a suspect form of inference, while persisting in using it to draw conclusions about the mind.
However, these problems are avoided if reverse inference is recast in likelihoodist terms. So recast, reverse inference allows cognitive neuroscientists to use brain images to determine which of two competing psychological hypotheses is best supported. A likelihoodist approach to reverse inference is partly restrictive: the range of its correct application is narrower than the range of its typical applications. Cognitive neuroscientists must be comparing two distinct psychological hypotheses: task T recruits psychological process p 1 versus task T recruits psychological process p 2 (Sections 4.2 and 4.3); they must have a good sense of how likely it is that a pattern of activation would be observed if p 1 and if p 2 were recruited (Section 4.1); and they must keep in mind that, so understood, reverse inference can only lead to comparative conclusions (Sections 4.4). When these conditions are not met, reverse inference is typically not applicable. On the other hand, a likelihoodist approach is only partly restrictive: It allows reverse inference to be used when these conditions are met (see, e.g. Fernandes et al. [2005] ); it does not recommend getting rid of reverse inference entirely (as, for example, Anderson [2010a] does); and it does not depend on obtaining the kind of information that is needed to apply a Bayesian reverse inference.
